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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SERGIO HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970399-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the pat-down search of the large bulge in defendant's pocket 
justified by reasonable suspicion? 
2. Was the seizure of the film canister from defendant's pocket justified by 
probable cause based on the totality of circumstances? 
Since the facts are undisputed, review of defendant's case is limited to the 
application of law to those facts. Whether a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion or to probable cause is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness with a measure of discretion to the trial judge when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994); see. ajso. State v. McGrath. 928 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Ct. App. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1986): 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of me physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing 
the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
2 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1980): 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably 
believes he or any other person is in danger. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. | 58-37-8 (1996) (R. 1). The charge was later amended to simple possession, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) (R. 41). Before 
trial, defendant moved to suppress the drugs seized from his person (R. 16-32). After 
the trial court denied the motion in an oral ruling (R. 116-120),1 defendant was 
convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve zero-to-five years in prison, with credit for 
time served (R. 61, 67)} Defendant timely appealed (R. 69-70). 
1
 The evidence from the preliminary hearing (R. 75-96), the parties' arguments 
on the motion (R. 97-116), and the trial court's oral ruling (R. 116-120) are at 
addendum A. 
2
 Because defendant was an illegal alien, the trial court authorized his release for 
deportation (R. 67). 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
The evidence is undisputed since defendant chose not to testify and he has not 
challenged the trial court's findings of fact (s§§ R. 118-120). In his brief, however, 
defendant simply ignores crucial facts that undermine his position. His omissions will 
be noted below. 
Surveillance and Seizure 
A police officer seized a film canister containing cocaine from defendant's 
pocket following surveillance and a pat-down search. 
Surveillance. Two Ogden City police officers on bike patrol had been carefully 
watching the area in front of the Marion Hotel after the hotel manager and several other 
citizens had complained about "transient type Hispanics" selling drugs there (R. 76-77). 
In the previous two years, one of the officers on patrol had made "over a hundred" 
drug arrests in that vicinity (R. 78, 118). 
Apparent drug transaction. While approaching the area on bikes at about 5:00 
p.m. on April 17, 1997, the two officers observed several white males standing in front 
of the hotel (R. 90). While the officers watched from less than a hundred feet away (R. 
83), defendant and another Hispanic man stopped to talk to two of the men (R. 76-77). 
Defendant quickly took something from his pocket and handed it to one of the men (R. 
77,91; see R. 118-119). One of the officers saw that the man had currency in his hand 
4 
during his exchange with defendant (R. 77, 84) .3 After the exchange, defendant and 
his Hispanic companion talked briefly, looked at the officers, and started walking in the 
other direction (R. 78, 91). The officer who had made multiple drug arrests in this 
area suspected that he had just witnessed another drug transaction (R. 3, 79,118). 
Initial investigation. To investigate, the officers first approached the man, 
named Ballard, who was still standing in front of the hotel and who had been a party to 
the exchange with defendant (R. 92). They asked Mr. Ballard if he knew defendant. 
Ig\ Ballard said they both lived at "St. Anne's." Id^ The officers then asked what had 
changed hands. I$L Ballard replied that defendant owed him a dollar, that he had 
asked for the money, and that defendant only had approximately fifty cents in change 
which defendant handed him (R. 78, 92). Ballard took change out of his left pocket to 
show the officers, but the officer who could best see the exchange had seen Ballard put 
whatever defendant handed him into his right pocket (R. 78; see R. 85). The officers 
did not further question Ballard at that time (R. 78, 84-85, 92-93, 119). 
Questioning defendant. Instead, the two officers rode their bikes to where 
defendant and his companion were getting ready to cross the street. One of the officers 
asked defendant, "[D]o you mind if we talk to you about your money transaction with 
3
 The other officer's view was obstructed because he was closest to the building, 
and there were several other men standing against the side of the building (R. 92). 
However, he did observe that the recipient "reached out" to defendant to begin the 
transaction (R. 91). 
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your friends up the.street?" Defendant shrugged and said, "[S]ure." The officer then 
asked, B[D]o you have any weapons or do you have any I.D. on you?" Defendant 
denied having any weapons, and started pulling everything out of his pants pockets (R. 
79, 93). 
Large bulge in defendant's pocket. Defendant was wearing bulky, loose-fitting 
pants with large pockets (R. 86). Defendant was also wearing a large oversized flannel 
shirt over a T-shirt which both hung down below his pants pockets (R. 93). When 
defendant pulled up his shirts to reach into his pockets, the officers saw a large bulge in 
defendant's left front pants pocket (R. 80, 94). Defendant pulled some change and his 
wallet from other pockets. After defendant pulled a wad of toilet tissue from his left 
pants pocket, both officers could still see a large bulge in that pocket (R. 79-80, 94). 
Defendant did not immediately produce identification, but stood with the contents he 
had pulled from his pockets in his hands (R. 3, 80). 
Defendant's three denials. One of the officers asked defendant what else he had 
in his pocket. Defendant said, n[N]othing."4 The officer said, "P can] still see 
something in your pocket. You have a pretty good bulge in your pocket." Defendant 
responded, "I have nothing else in my pocket." The officer asked again, "[W]hat do 
4
 Defendant's marshaling of facts in support of reasonable suspicion stops here. 
He discusses his denial, but fails to mention his three, specific denials in response to 
the officer's questions (§££ Def. Br. at 4, 7). 
6 
you have in your pocket?" I&. Defendant again replied, "[N]othing. * (R. 80; sje. R. 
119). 
Suspected weapon. Neither officer could tell what the bulge was (R. 80, 94). 
It appeared "big and round," was not head-on, but was "twisted . . . sideways" in 
defendant's pocket (R. 80, 85-88, 94). Both officers thought it could have been a 
weapon (R. 80, 88, 94). One of the officers knew from experience that people 
involved in drug transactions often carry weapons, and he thought that, from its 
appearance, the bulge could have been "a small caliber gun" (R. 88).5 
Furtive movement: pat-down. After his third denial, defendant started to shove 
* the wadded-up toilet paper back into his left pocket (R. 80).6 The officer who 
suspected that the bulge in that pocket might be a small caliber gun believed defendant 
was trying to hide what was in his pocket, and so, "on the outside of the pocket," the 
officer "reached and grabbed to feel what it was" and "to see if it was a weapon." Id,. 
The officer felt a lid on top of a container, and immediately recognized the bulge 
to be a plastic film canister, since he had taken "a lot of plastic film canisters off of a 
5
 Defendant's recitation of facts completely ignores the undisputed testimony by 
the officers summarized in this paragraph (see Def. Br. at 4, 6-7). 
6
 Defendant ignores this crucial fact (§ee_ Def. Br. at 4, 6-7). 
7 
lot of other people who deal in narcotics," and since, as a photographer, he had a lot of 
them himself (R. 80-81; see also. R. 4, 94, 119-120).7 
Defendant's fourth denial, furtive movement: seizure. The officer then asked 
defendant one last time what he had in his pocket (R. 81). For the fourth time, 
defendant said, "Nothing," and began reaching his hand back into the pocket (R. 81).8 
The officer thought defendant was going to take the lid off the canister, so he took the 
canister out of defendant's pocket. Mt (§e§ R. 120). 
The officer opened the lid and found "eight individually wrapped packages of 
white powdery substance" that had been hot-sealed (R. 82-81). In the officer's 
experience, drugs individually packaged in this way are consistent with distribution, as 
opposed to individual use (R. 82). The other officer went back to talk again with Mr. 
Ballard and found that he had no currency, only the change he had already shown the 
officers (R. 93; see also R. 77, 84). Defendant was arrested and charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (R. 1-2, 41). 
7
 In response to a question about his experience with film canisters and narcotics, 
the officer testified that "at least 95 percent of the time if I find a film canister, it is 
either empty or got residue in it, or it has some narcotics in it" (R. 81). 
8
 Defendant ignores this undisputed testimony (see. Def. Br. at 4, 6-7). 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I. The pat-down search of the large bulge in defendant's pocket was 
justified by reasonable suspicion. An officer observed defendant's participation in an 
apparent drug transaction in front of a hotel, an area notorious for illegal drug sales. 
When approached and asked whether he had any weapons or identification, defendant 
emptied his pockets leaving a large bulge still visible in his left front pants pocket. 
Defendant nevertheless denied three times having anything in his pocket. Based on the 
size and shape of the bulge, knowledge that persons involved in drug transactions often 
carry weapons, and defendant's denials, the officer reasonably believed that the bulge 
in defendant's pocket could be a weapon. When defendant began to reach into the 
pocket, the officer was justified in conducting a pat-down search to determine if it 
contained a weapon. 
Point n . The seizure of the item from defendant's pocket was justified by 
probable cause based on the totality of circumstances. When he touched it through 
defendant's clothing, the officer immediately recognized the large bulge as a film 
canister, an item the officer knew is commonly used to transport drugs. Based on the 
i • 
officer's observation of defendant's participation in an apparent drug transaction, 
defendant's repeated denials that he had anything in his pocket, and the results of the 
pat-down search, the officer had probable cause to seize the film canister. After the 
9 
pat-down search, when defendant denied again having anything in his pocket and began 
reaching into the pocket again, the officer was justified in seizing the film canister. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE LARGE BULGE IN 
DEFENDANT'S POCKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
Defendant does not dispute that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain 
and question him.9 Instead, he challenges the basis for the subsequent pat-down search 
of the large bulge in his pants pocket (Def. Br. at 6). Defendant argues that the 
officers' "sole reason for suspecting a weapon was their belief that a drug transaction 
9
 This Court recognizes three levels of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person 
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Deitman. 739 
P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 
223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied sub nom. 106 S. Ct. 2250 (1986)). 
10 
had transpired." IgL He asserts, "At no time did [either officer] express any articulable 
reason that they suspected this Defendant of carrying a weapon." LL 
These central assertions are contradicted by the officers' undisputed testimony 
(see R. 79-80, 87-88, 94). Indeed, defendant's argument fails because he ignores or 
omits crucial facts and circumstances that don't support his position. 
A. Terrv Pat-down 
In Terrv v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the Supreme Court held that an officer 
may conduct a pat-down of a suspected criminal for dangerous weapons if the officer 
reasonably believes the suspect to be armed and dangerous. The Terrv Court 
specifically held that a pat-down is reasonable (1) "where a police officer observes 
unusual conduct" which he interprets "in light of his experience" as indicating possible 
criminal activity and present danger, (2) "where in the course of investigating this 
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and [3] 
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear 
for his own or other's safety." Id* at 1884. A reviewing court considers "whether a 
reasonably prudent man in [these] circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety . . . was in danger." IJL at 1883. A Terry pat-down must be "a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might 
be used to assault [the officer]." &. at 1884-1885; eL Michigan v. Long. 103 S. Ct. 
3469, 3481 (1983) (if officer has specific articulable facts which reasonably warrant the 
11 
belief that suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons, officer 
can search suspect and nearby areas where weapon may be hidden). 
Utah has codified Terrv: "A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily 
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes 
he or any other person is in danger." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (1980). 
B. Basis for Pat-Down Search: Reasonable Suspicion 
In defendant's case, the trial court correctly concluded that the officer 
conducting the pat-down had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and 
dangerous (see R. 118-120). 
1. The officer "observed unusual conduct" which he interpreted "in light of his 
experience" as indicating possible criminal activity and present danger (Terry. 88 S.Ct. 
at 1884). The officer observed defendant stop to talk with a man in front of a hotel (a 
location notorious for illegal drug sales), quickly exchange something with the man, 
including currency, look at the officers, and begin walking in the other direction (R. 
77-78, 84, 91). Based on his experience, the officer reasonably suspected that he had 
witnessed an illegal drug transaction (R. 76-79, 118). Seg Minnesota v. Dickerson. 
113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993) (reasonable suspicion where suspect left notorious "crack 
house," made eye contact with police, began walking in the other direction); United 
States v. Magda. 547 F.2d 756 (2nd Cir. 1976) (stop justified where man exchanged 
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something with another in an area notorious for drug traffic, then rapidly turned away 
upon seeing police officer). 
Likewise, based on his experience, the officer knew that people who use and 
transport illegal drugs often carry weapons (R. 88). Seje. State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 
88-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (officer entitled to assess the facts in light of his 
experience); see also. State v. Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, 
J., concurring) (officer could reasonably assume individuals suspected of participating 
in moving large quantities of illegal drugs over long distances may be armed); State v. 
Chapman. 841 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah App. 1992) (Orme, J., dissenting) (courts justify 
pat-down searches "when the nature of the underlying offense raises reasonable 
suspicion that a weapon is present"), afPd in part and rev'd in part. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1996).10 
10
 C£ People v. Ratcliff. 778 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1989) (right to frisk incident to 
stop re suspected street-corner drug sale, as officer "had previously encountered armed 
suspects under similar circumstances"); State v. Butler. 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 
(1992) (right to frisk incident to stop re suspected street corner drug sale, as 
"defendant, as a person reasonably suspected of involvement in drug traffic, might be 
armed"); United States v. Sinclair. 983 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1993) (proper to frisk 
suspected supplier of local drug dealer, given recent law enforcement "experience with 
drug traffickers"); United States v. Salazar. 945 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1991) (stressing 
police "know that narcotics dealers frequently carry weapons"); United States v. Salas. 
879 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1989) (proper to frisk one reasonably believed to be "a narcotics 
dealer"), cert, denied. 110 S.Ct. 502 (1989); United States v. Gilliard. 847 F.2d 21 (1st 
Cir. 1981) (firearms "tools of the trade" of drug traffickers), cert, denied. 109 S.Ct. 
846 (1989). 
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2. In the course of investigating this behavior, the officer identified himself as a 
policeman and made reasonable inquiries (Terry. 88 S.Ct. at 1884). Since defendant 
was walking the other way, the officer first approached and contacted Mr. Ballard, the 
other party to the suspected transaction, and asked him to explain his actions (R. 92; 
see Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980)). The information provided by Mr. Ballard was 
inconsistent with what the officer had just observed (R. 118-119). The officer had seen 
currency exchanged and Ballard place whatever defendant handed him in his right pants 
pocket (R. 77, 84, 91). But, when questioned, Ballard made no mention of currency, 
said that defendant had only given him some change to pay part of the money that he 
owed him, and pulled change out of his left pocket to show the officers (R.78, 92). 
3. Nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the officer's 
reasonable fear for his own or other's safety (Terry, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). Ballard's 
attempt to mislead the officer increased the officer's suspicion and led him to 
investigate the matter further with defendant (gee, R. 119). Cf State v. Leonard. 825 
P.2d 664, 669 (Utah App.) (implausible explanation, contradicting evidence known to 
police, justified arrest), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (1992). When he approached 
defendant, the officer asked if he had any weapons and asked him for identification (R. 
79, 93). The initial question about weapons demonstrates that the officer already had 
some concern for his safety. 
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Defendant denied having any weapons, and began emptying his pockets (R. 79, 
93). After defendant stood with the contents of his pockets in his hands, the officer stUl 
saw a large bulge in defendant's left front pants pocket (R. 79-80, 94). From what he 
saw of the big, round object, which was sideways in defendant's baggy pocket, the 
officer suspected that it could have been the barrel of "a small caliber gun" (R. 85-88). 
QL State v. Rochell. 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1993) (reasonable suspicion to 
frisk where officer saw bulge in defendant's pocket, believed the bulge could have been 
a weapon, and when asked whether he had any weapons, defendant "was hesitant in 
answering no"). 
When the officer asked what he had in his pocket, defendant replied, 
"[N]othing" (R. 80). When the officer pointed out to defendant that he could still see 
"a pretty good bulge" in defendant's pocket, defendant replied, "I have nothing else in 
my pocket." Id. When the officer asked a third time what he had in his pocket, 
defendant again replied, "[N]othing." IsL, and R. 119. 
Defendant's three denials, which were inconsistent with the large bulge the 
officer clearly saw in defendant's pocket, did nothing to dispel the officer's reasonable 
fear for his safety. Indeed, each denial only gave him more reason for concern (R. 
119-120). S_£g Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.5(a) at 250 ("if in 
response to inquiries the suspect gives an implausible account of his actions, this can 
help establish grounds to frisk") (citing State v. Valentine. 134 NJ. 536, 636 A.2d 505 
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(1994tt: cf. United States v. Williams. 822 F.2d 1174, 1180-1181 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
("Williams attempts to conceal the bag could easily and naturally have caused the 
officer even greater anxiety . . . . [Therefore, his seizure of the bag] was motivated by 
a well-founded concern for his own safety"). 
Defendant gave the officer even more reason to fear for his safety when, after 
his denials, he began to shove his hand back into the bulging pocket. It then appeared 
not only that defendant might be armed, but that he was presently dangerous. In 
response, the officer reached out and grabbed the outside of defendant's pocket to feel 
whether the bulge was a weapon (R. 80). 
The pat-down search by the officer was reasonable: 
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or others, it would appear to be clearly 
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to 
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to 
neutralize the threat of physical harm. 
Terrv. 88 S.Ct. at 1881. Indeed, it was only when it appeared defendant was actually 
reaching for the suspected weapon that the officer conducted a pat-down search of the 
pocket. As in Terrv. "a reasonably prudent man in [these] circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety . . . was in danger." IJL at 1883. 
In summary, because the officer (1) observed defendant's participation in an 
apparent drug transaction, (2) knew from his experience that persons who use or 
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transport drugs often carry weapons, and (3) saw a large bulge in defendant's pants 
pocket that appeared to be a gun or other weapon, and because, when questioned, 
(4) defendant denied three times having anything in his pocket and (5) defendant then 
began reaching into the pocket, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that justified his 
pat-down search of the pocket. 
Point H 
THE SEIZURE OF THE FILM CANISTER FROM DEFENDANT'S 
POCKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON A 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Defendant is not arguing that the officer did not immediately detect that the 
bulge in his pocket was a film canister. Instead, defendant argues simply that, since a 
film canister is not "contraband per se" and possessing one is not "inherently illegal," 
the trial court erred when it concluded that the officer's seizure of the film canister 
from defendant was appropriate (Def. Br. at 7-8). 
Defendant's argument ignores the totality of circumstances that provided 
probable cause for the seizure in his case. The question is not "per se" or "inherent" 
illegality, but whether, given all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of 
the seizing officer, a person of reasonable caution would believe that the item may be 
contraband or other evidence of a crime. Texas v. Brown. 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543-1544 
(1983) (plurality opinion); State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986). In other 
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words, a film canister may or may not be contraband or evidence of a crime depending 
on the totality of circumstances. 
A. Plain-Feel Seizure 
In Minnesota v. Dickerson. 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993), the Supreme Court 
held that "police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a 
protective patdown search" authorized by Terrv. The Court reasoned, 
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels 
an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, 
there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already 
authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, 
its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical 
considerations that inhere in the plain view context. 
LL at 2136. 
Although applied by courts in a majority of federal and state jurisdictions,11 the 
11
 See, e.g.. the following cases discussing "plain feel" or "plain touch": 
(federal) Dickerson. 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993); United States v. Ashlev. 37 F.3d 678 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Schiavo. 29 F.3d 6 (1st Or. 1994); United States v. 
Ocampo. 650 F.2d 421 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Ponce. 8 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Rivers. 121 F.3d 1043 (7* Cir. 1997); United States v. Craft. 
30 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Flippin. 924 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1991); 
(state) Martin v. State. 695 So.2d 141 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); State v. Millan. 916 P.2d 
1114 (Ariz.App.Div. 1995); Jackson v. State. 804 S.W.2d 735 (Ark. 1991); People v. 
Dibb. 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 (Call.App. 5 Dist. 1995); People v. Hughes. 767 P.2d 1201 
(Colo. 1989); State v. Gubitosi. 683 A.2d 419 (Conn.App. 1996); King v. State. 633 
A.2d 370 (Del.Supr. 1993); Dickerson v. United States. 677 A.2d 509 (D.C.App. 
1996); State v. Burns. 698 So.2d 1282 (Fla.App. 5 Dist. 1997); Tavlor v. State. 491 
S.E.2d 417 (Ga.App. 1997); State v. Ortiz. 683 P.2d 822 (Hawai'i 1984); People v. 
Mitchell. 650 N.E.2d 1014 (111. 1995); M. Stone v. State. 671 N.E.2d 499 (Ind.App. 
1996); State v. Wonders. - P.2d - , 1998 WL 21843 (Kan. 1998); Pitman v. 
Commonwealth. 896 S.W.2d 19 (Ky.App. 1995); State v. Ratliff. 700 So.2d 213 
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plain-feel (or plain-touch) doctrine approved in Dickerson has not yet been applied in a 
reported case in Utah. Nevertheless, the test for justifying a plain-feel seizure is based 
on a well-settled principle. 
B. Basis for Plain-Feel Seizure: Probable Cause Based on Totality of the 
Circumstances 
The basis for a plain-feel seizure is that the item's contraband nature be 
"immediately apparent" from a pat-down. The Supreme Court equates this 
"immediately apparent" requirement with probable cause. Thus, to justify a seizure 
under the plain-feel doctrine, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the 
item felt during a pat-down search is contraband. Dickerson. 113 S.Ct. at 2137; 
Arizona v. Hicks. 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153 (1987): Brown. 103 S.Ct. at 1542-1543 
(plurality opinion). 
(La.App. 4 Cir. 1997); Jones v. State. 682 A.2d 248 (Md. 1996); Commonwealth v. 
Lopez. 1996 WL 339948 (Mass.Super. 1996); People v. Tavlor. 564 N.W.2d 24 
(Mich. 1997); Matter of Welfare of G.M.. 560 N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 1997); State v. 
Rushing. 935 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1996); State v. Stubbs. 892 P.2d 547 (Mont. 1995); 
State v. Craven. - N.W.2d -, 1997 WL 780883 (Neb. 1997); State v. Jackson. 648 
A.2d 738 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1994); State v. Vasquez. 815 P.2d 659 (N.M.App. 1991); 
Matter of Gregory M.. 627 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Benjamin. 478 S.E.2d 
651 (N.C.App. 1996); State v. Woods. 680 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio App.2 Dist. 1996); 
Scott v. State. 927 P.2d 1066 (Okla.Cnm.App. 1996); State v. Slowikowski. 761 P.2d 
1315 (Or. 1988); Commonwealth v. Fink. 700 A.2d 447 (Pa.Super. 1997); State v. 
Smith. 1998 WL 6442 (S.C.App. 1998); State v. Bridges. 1997 WL 804629 (Tenn. 
1997); Williams v. State. 1997 WL 167871 (Tex.App.-Hous. 1 Dist. 1997); Ruffinv. 
Commonwealth. 409 S.E.2d 177 (Va. 1991); State v. Dempsev. 947 P.2d 265 
(Wash.App. Div. 3 1997); State v. Greenwood. - N.W.-, 1997 WL 629853 (Wis.App. 
1997); Perrv v. State. 927 P.2d 1158 (Wyo. 1996). 
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It is well-settled that probable cause is determined by "a totality of the 
circumstances.'* United States v. Leon. 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416-17 (1984); Illinois v. 
Gates. 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (1983); State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 
1997); State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 832 (Utah App. 1991). It exists when the facts 
and circumstances within the knowledge of the seizing officer are sufficient to warrant 
a person "of reasonable caution" to believe that the item "may be contraband" or other 
evidence of a crime. Brown. 103 S.Ct. at 1543-1544 (plurality opinion); accord 
Dorsev. 731 P.2d at 1088 ("Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances 
within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in 
the belief that'" contraband or evidence of a crime will be found) (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States. 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11 (1949)); gee al§o. Yoder. 935 P.2d at 540 
("probable cause means a 'fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 
be found'") (quoting State v. Nguven. 878 P.2d 1183, 1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citation omitted)). 
The plain-feel doctrine is a logical and reasonable extension of Terry. In 
Dickerson. the Supreme Court noted that Terry itself had demonstrated that "the sense 
of touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to 
support a seizure." Dickerson. 113 S.Ct. at 2137. The Court concluded that, "the 
Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that 
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the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative 
seizures." Id. 
C. Probable Cause in Defendant's Case 
The totality of circumstances here is sufficient to support a finding that the 
officer had probable cause to believe defendant was carrying drugs before he seized the 
film canister. The officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and 
dangerous had justified his pat-down search of defendant's bulging pocket (see Point I, 
above). Once the officer felt the large bulge and immediately recognized it as a film 
canister, an item commonly used to transport drugs, he had probable cause to seize it 
because: 
1. The officer had observed defendant's participation in what 
appeared to a drug transaction in a location notorious for illegal drug sales 
(R. 76-78, 83, 90-91, 118). 
2. When defendant and his companion saw the officers after the 
transaction, they began walking the other way (R. 78, 91). 
3. Although an officer had seen currency change hands and 
Ballard put what defendant handed him into his right pocket, Ballard 
claimed defendant had only given him a small amount of change which he 
showed the officers after taking it from his left pocket (R. 78, 92). 
4. Defendant denied three times having anything in his pocket, 
even though officers could see a large bulge (R. 79-80, 93, 119); see 
Yoder. 935 P.2d at 541-542 (responses by suspect which the officer 
knows to be false may well constitute probable cause when considered 
with prior suspicions). 
5. After denying that he had anything in his bulging pocket, 
defendant began to reach into the pocket (R. 80). 
6. During his pat-down search, the officer felt the bulge, and 
immediately recognized it as a film canister (R. 80-81), which the officer 
knew was commonly used to transport drugs. Id. (seen. 13. belowV See 
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Dorsev. 731 P.2d at 1088; Yoder. 935 P.2d at 540. 
Although at this point the officer was justified in seizing the film canister, he 
chose not to. Instead, the officer once more asked defendant what he had in his pocket. 
Defendant still denied having anything in his pocket, and began, once again, to reach 
into the pocket.12 At this point, the officer was more than justified in seizing the 
canister. 
In sum, the totality of circumstances justified the warrantless seizure here. 
D. Specific Case Authority Regarding Film Canisters and Probable Cause 
Defendant cites a single case, Campbell v. Texas. 864 S.W.2d 223 (Texas 
1993), in support of his proposal for a per se rule in Utah that a film canister is not 
contraband (see Def. Br. at 8). However, Campbell itself supports the totality of 
circumstances test in a case involving a film canister. 
In Campbell, the officer made a traffic stop of Campbell's car after seeing it 
weaving between lanes. Upon approaching the stopped car, the officer smelled alcohol 
on Campbell's breath and observed a cup Campbell said had contained a "Bloody 
Mary." Campbell. 864 S.W.2d at 224. The court concluded that the officer had no 
12
 It is clear that exigent circumstances also justified this warrantless seizure. 
Defendant was alerted and was reaching for the canister. See Davis v. State. 813 P.2d 
1178 (Utah 1991) (fair reading of probable cause exception requires exigent 
circumstances for warrantless seizure); State v. Nguven. 878 P.2d 1183,1187 n.2 
(Utah App. 1994) (best information available indicated that occupants were disposing of 
potential evidence from suspected crime). 
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reason to suspect Campbell was concealing contraband, and therefore the incriminating 
character of the film canister he felt during a consensual pat-down search was not 
"immediately apparent" and did not justify its seizure. jfcL at 226. Contrary to 
defendant's assertions, Campbell does not support the proposition that a film canister 
can never be considered contraband. On the contrary, under the totality of 
circumstances in Campbell, the officer simply had no reason to suspect that Campbell 
was trying to conceal contraband. 
In contrast, the officer here saw defendant in an apparent drug transaction. 
When questioned, it was clear defendant was trying to conceal something which 
appeared to be a weapon in his pants pocket. Given the totality of circumstances in 
defendant's case, the contraband nature of the film canister was immediately apparent 
after a pat-down search. Indeed, the distinctions between Campbell and 
defendant's case simply underscore the importance of the totality of circumstances in 
making a probable cause determination, and weigh against any per se rule. 
The facts and circumstances in State v. Rushing. 935 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1996), 
cert, denied. 117 S.Ct. 1713 (1997) (addendum B), are much closer to those in 
defendant's case. In Rushing, an officer observed a car stopped in an area notorious 
for drug trafficking. As he watched, the officer saw Rushing participate in an apparent 
drug transaction with the driver of the stopped car. When later approached, Rushing 
denied any involvement. During a pat-down search, the officer felt a tubular item in 
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Rushing's front pants pocket. The officer immediately thought the item was a plastic 
"Life Saver Hole candy container, which is a common container used by crack dealers 
to carry their crack cocaine in." Rushing. 935 S.W.2d at 31-32 (recognizing also that 
medicine bottles, plastic baggies, and film canisters commonly contain drugs). The 
officer's belief was based on knowledge of the apparent drug transaction, the area they 
were in, and his previous training and experience. Id. at 31. 
The officer removed the item from defendant's pocket, and found it to be a 
cylindrical plastic medicine bottle containing ten rocks of crack cocaine. IsL at 32-33. 
The Missouri Supreme Court found that the seizure was justified by probable cause 
based on "1) the officer's feel of the object, 2) his knowledge of the suspicious 
transaction observed by [another officer], 3) the reputation of the neighborhood as a 
drug trafficking area, and 4) his knowledge of commonly used containers." Id. at 33. 
The court specifically concluded that there was probable cause for the seizure even 
though the officer "felt the container rather than the cocaine itself. . . . [since] [t]he 
distinctive character of the container itself revealed its probable contents to the trained 
officer." IJL13 
13
 Utah and applicable federal precedent support the experience of the officers in 
Rushing, and in defendant's case, that film canisters are often used to carry drugs. See 
(Utah): State v. Mavcock. 947 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah App. 1997) (film container held 
drug paraphernalia); State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995, 996 (Utah App. 1992) (film 
canister used to transport cocaine), affd. 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996); State v. Sterger. 
808 P.2d 122,123 (Utah App. 1991) (film canister contained marijuana); State v. 
Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah 1983) (film canister contained marijuana); 
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In sum, it is clear that the contraband nature of a film canister (or any item), is 
not based solely on what may be its innocent use but on the totality of circumstances 
surrounding its detection during a pat-down search. £§£ Commonwealth v. Burnside. 
425 Pa.Super. 425, 430, 625 A.2d. 678, 681 (1993) ("while a particular type of 
container may have lawful purposes, the circumstances under which a trained narcotics 
detective views its use may be tantamount to a view of the actual contraband"). Based 
on the totality of circumstances in defendant's case, the contraband nature of the film 
canister was immediately apparent to the officer, and, therefore, its seizure was 
justified. See State v. Champion. 452 Mich. 92, 549 N.W.2d 849 (1996) (probable 
cause justified seizure where pill bottle immediately apparent after pat-down, and 
officer knew pill bottles often used to carry illegal drugs), cert, denied. 117 S.Ct. 747 
(1997); see also Kansas v. Wonders. - P.2d - , 1998 WL 21843 (Kan. 1998) (probable 
(federal): sjg Ohio v. Robinette. 117 S.Ct. 417, 419 (1996) (film container held 
controlled substance); United States v. Harris. 995 F.2d 1004, 1005 (10* Cir. 1993) 
(film canister contained six rocks of crack cocaine), cert, denied. I l l S.Ct. 197 (1990); 
United States v. Nicholson. 938 F.2d 983, 986 (10th Cir. 1993) (film canister contained 
heroin); United States v. Pettit. 903 F.2d 1336 (10th Cir. 1990) (film canisters 
contained twenty-one baggies of crack cocaine); United States v. Hanks. 821 F.Supp. 
1425, 1427 (D. Kansas 1993) (film canister contained marijuana), appeal dismissed. 24 
F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gilmer. 793 F.Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. 
Colorado 1992) (film canister contained crack cocaine). 
Appellate decisions from other states also corroborate the officers' experience. 
See, e.g.. State v. Anderson. 259 Kan. 16, 17, 910 P.2d 180, 181 (Kansas 1996) 
(officer knew film container often used to transport illicit drugs); State v. Walker. 93 
N.M. 769, 770, 605 P.2d 1168," 1169 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (film container contained 
marijuana residue). 
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cause justified seizure where, after pat-down, immediately apparent to officer that bulge 
in pocket was bag of marijuana); In the Interest of B.C.. 453 Pa.Super. 294, 683 A.2d 
919 (1996) (probable cause justified seizure where officers observed apparent drug 
transaction and bag of marijuana immediately apparent to officer after pat-down); State 
v. Trine. 236 Conn. 216, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996) (probable cause justified seizure where 
rock cocaine in baggie in pants pocket immediately apparent to officer during pat-
down).14 
14
 Because defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest, 
the seizure and opening of the film canister may also be justified on alternative 
grounds: as a search incident to arrest. Based on the totality of circumstances, the 
officer had probable cause to arrest after he identified the film canister in defendant's 
pocket during the pat-down search. §§§ Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1986) (warrantless 
arrest authorized where, among other reasons, offense committed in presence of officer 
and reasonable cause to believe arrestee may destroy or conceal evidence or injure 
another person); Chimel v. California. 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-2040, reh. denied. 90 
S.Ct. 36 (1969) (warrantless arrest and full search of arrestee for weapons and 
contraband authorized where probable cause); Rawlings v. Kentucky. 100 S.Ct. 2556, 
2564-2565 (1980) (even if search and seizure chronologically precede a formal arrest, 
they may be constitutionally valid as long as arrest and search and seizure are 
substantially contemporaneous and are integral parts of same incident); accord State v. 
Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986) (regardless of when Banks arrested, search and 
discovery of drug were clearly preceded by probable cause for his arrest and were 
therefore valid); see also People v. Dibb. 37 Cal.App.4th 832, 835 (1995) (where 
officer had probable cause to arrest based in part on results of pat-down search, search 
of object authorized as search incident to arrest); State v. Trine. 236 Conn. 216, 238, 
673 A.2d 1098,1111 (1996) (seizure of cocaine from pocket permissible because 
officer had probable cause to arrest Trine); State v. Champion. 452 Mich. 92, 115-117, 
549 N.W.2d 849, 860-862 (1996) (search of pill bottle before formal arrest qualifies as 
search incident to arrest if probable cause for arrest existed before bottle searched). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
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Addendum A 
(Evidence from the preliminary hearing, R. 75-96; 
the parties' arguments on the motion, R. 97-116; 
and the trial court's oral ruling, R. 116-120) 
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THE COURT: This is the time set for Preliminary 
Hearing. Is the State ready? 
MR, PARMLEY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gravis, is the defense ready? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor, although, your Honor, 
I believe we do need an interpreter for my client. 
(Colloquy waiting for interpreter.) 
MR. GRAVIS: While we are waiting, I will invoke th^ 
exclusionary rule. 
THE COURT: All right. How many witnesses? 
MR. PARMLEY: We will call Officer Hall this 
morning. Officer Clark is with him. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer Clark, if you will 
step outside, please. Do not discuss your testimony with 
anyone. If you are chosen to testify, you will be asked to 
come back in. Thank you sir. 
(Interpreter sworn.) 
THE COURT: Very well. With that, Mr. Parmley, is 
there an opening statement from the State? 
MR. PARMLEY: No. Mr. Gravis has agreed for 
purposes of this hearing to stipulate that the substance was 
cocaine. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: A witness would testify that it tested 
positive for cocaine, only for purposes of this hearing. 
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THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. PARMLEY: We will call Officer Hall. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court will accept the 
stipulation for purposes of this hearing. And, Officer Hall, 
if you will raise your right hand and be sworn, please. 
NORMAN HALL 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARMLEY: 
Q Tell us your name, please, and your occupation. 
A Norman Hall, Police Officer for Ogden City Police 
Department. 
Q Were you on duty April 17th about 5:00 p.m.? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Was that in the area of 25th Street and Lincoln? 
A Yes. 
Q What were you doing at that location, Officer Hall? 
A Officer Clark and I were patrolling that area, going| 
down the sidewalks on our police bikes. 
Q Would you tell us what, if anything, unusual you 
observed at that time? 
A We observed the Defendant and another Hispanic had 
stopped to talk to two white male individuals in front of the 
Marion Hotel. We had been watching this area carefully 
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because we had been getting word from the Marion Hotel manager 
and several people on the street that transient type Hispanic^ 
were selling narcotics on the street. 
As we watched them# they stopped and talked. I saw the 
Defendant take something out of his right pocket and hand it 
to the right hand of--I later identified the white guy was Mr.| 
Ballard. Whatever it was. 
Q What was it about this exchange that drew your 
attention to it? What was there about this that caught your 
eye? 
A Well, we saw some money in one hand change hands. 
We didn't know what the object was. What they handed, Mr. 
Ballard shoved into his pocket. To me, it looked like a drug 
buy. 
Q Did you see both the money and some other object? 
A I didn't see the object they passed. I saw the 
money they passed. 
Q Okay. Did you see hands exchanging something other 
than the money? 
A Right, I saw hands exchanging. And whatever he 
handed Mr. Ballard, he put it in his pocket. 
Q All right. So you saw money actually change hands. 
And you saw something else exchanged? 
A Yeah, right. We were just crossing Lincoln when 
they made the exchange. 
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Q Al l r i g h t . And Mr. Ballard you sa id put something 
in h i s pocket? 
A Correct. 
Q Appeared to put something in his pocket. You said 
just a minute ago that that appeared consistent with what you 
observed with drug exchanges in this area? 
A Yeah, I made several drug arrests on 25th Street in 
the parking lots where the exchange has been made and sold 
there. I probably made over a hundred just right from in that) 
area the last couple of years. 
Q What did you do after you had seen that? 
A Well, the Defendant and his friend walked--they 
were--they talked. They conversed. They looked at us, and 
they walked off westbound. Mr. Ballard and another gentleman 
stood there. We stopped and talked to Mr. Ballard first. 
And Mr. Ballard explained Mr. Hernandez just owed him 
some money from St. Anne's. He had stayed at St. Anne's and 
he owed him a dollar. And he pulled some money out. But he 
didn't pull it out of the right pocket. He pulled it out of 
the left pocket, and pulled out some change. 
Q Now, which pocket was it on Mr. Ballard where you 
had seen him take whatever it was that Mr. Hernandez had 
handed him? 
A It went into his right pocket. 
Q All right. 
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A The money he pulled out, Mr. Ballard pulled out, was} 
out of his left pocket. 
Q What did you do then at that point, Officer? 
A Jeff and I talked to Mr. Ballard for a minute. It 
was obvious that, you know, we didn't know what--for sure--I 
mean I was pretty--I thought maybe it was a drug deal. I 
couldn't prove anything. He said let's go down and see if thej 
two Hispanic gentlemen will talk to us or not. 
Q All right. How did you go about that? 
A We went down. They were waiting for the light to 
cross Wall. So we got off our bikes and asked if we could 
talk to him. I asked the Defendant do you mind if we talk to 
you. 
Q Tell us exactly how you approached them. 
A We got off our bikes and went up to them. They werej 
standing there. Actually, they weren't facing Wall. They 
were facing south. I said do you mind if we talk to you about) 
your money transaction with your friends up the street? He 
just shrugged his head and said sure. 
I asked him do you have any weapons or do you have any 
I.D. on you? He said no, he didn't have any weapons. He 
started pulling everything out of his pants pockets. He 
pulled some change out, pulled his wallet out of his left reaxj 
pocket. Pulled some toilet tissue out of his left front 
pocket. But I could still see a bulge in his left front 
•a 
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pocket. I asked him what else he had in his pocket. He said 
nothing. I said I could still see something in your pocket. 
You have a pretty good bulge in your pocket. And he said I 
have nothing else in my pocket. 
Q Had he given you identification at that time? 
A No, he was just holding everything in his hands. 
Q All right. 
A And at that time he hadn't given me his wallet. He 
was holding a bunch of stuff, his change and his wallet and 
stuff. But he hadn't given me anything yet. 
Q All right. 
A And then I asked him again what do you have in your 
pocket. And he said nothing. He had a wadded up toilet papeij 
that he shoved back into his left pocket. I think he was 
trying to hide what was in his left pocket at that time. I 
could still see the big round bulge in it. So I just--on the 
outside of the pocket, I reached and grabbed to feel what it 
was. 
Q And why did you do that at that time? 
A To see if it was a weapon. To make sure what he had] 
in his pocket. 
Q And when you felt the bulge, did you recognize what 
it may be? 
A Yeah,- I recognized it. It was a plastic--
Q How is it you recognized it? 
8j 
080 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Well, I have taken a lot of plastic film canisters 
off of a lot of other people who deal in narcotics. Plus I 
have a lot of them myself because I shoot a lot of film 
myself. I know what a plastic film canister is. I have a lot] 
of them. 
Q What is your experience with film canisters and 
narcotics? 
A I would say probably at least 95 percent of the time] 
if I find a film canister, it is either empty or got residue 
in it, or it has got some narcotics in it. 
Q What did you do when you felt that bulge and 
recognized it as a film canister? 
A I asked him again what he had in his pocket. He 
said nothing. He reached in his hand. I thought--it looked 
like to me he was going to take the lid off. I know there wa^ 
a lid, I could feel the lid. You could feel the outside of 
the lid on the top of the thing. I reached down in the pocket] 
down towards past the toilet paper and I just reached in and 
finally took it out of his pocket. 
Q You reached in and took it? 
A I reached in and took it out of his pocket. 
Q And what did you discover when you removed it from 
his pocket? 
A I opened the lid, and there were eight individually 
wrapped packages of white powdery substance. What they do is 
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they cut a round piece of plastic out, put the cocaine in it, 
twist it, and seal it with something hot. They seal the 
plastic so it is wrapped. 
Q Did each of the eight contain the white powdery 
substance? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q Have you seen in your experience--
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, for purposes of Preliminary 
Hearing I will stipulate in his experience he has seen drugs 
packaged like that. And he won't have to testify to that. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to accept that 
stipulation, counsel? 
MR. PARMLEY: Basically what I wanted was his 
opinion individually packaged in that manner is consistent in 
his opinion with distribution. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you willing to accept that 
stipulation? 
MR. GRAVIS: For purposes of Preliminary Hearing, 
yes. 
THE COURT: very well. The Court will accept the 
stipulation also. 
MR. PARMLEY: Then that's all we have. 
THE COURT: Okay. Cross. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
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Q Yeah. You said you observed the transaction taking 
place. You were--where at on Lincoln--where were you at when 
you first observed it, the man was talking to Mr. Ballard? 
A We had just passed the Kokomo westbound. 
Q Okay. So you were what, two or three hundred feet 
away? 
A No, not even a hundred feet. 
Q Okay. Now you and Officer Clark had received 
reports that Hispanics or illegals were dealing drugs, 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q What physical description did you get? 
A Just transient type looking Hispanic males. 
Q How many transient type that look exactly the same 
do you routinely see on 25th Street in the area of Lincoln? 
A We see several. 
Q Several, okay. So there was no--nothing particular 
about Mr. Hernandez, other than he was Hispanic, looked like a| 
Hispanic male. You see him. You see him talking to Mr. 
Ballard. ' 
Now at that point in time all you see is him reaching in 
his pocket, take something out and handing it to Mr. Ballard, 
i 
correct? 
A Yeah. Well, he is handing something. Mr. Ballard 
is also handing something. And Ballard is handing him money. 
1U 
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Q Now you say Ballard is handing him money? 
A I wasn't sure. I could see the money in their hand.| 
Q Well, you saw--whose hand did you see the money in? 
A Ballard's hand. 
Q Okay, Ballard stuck his hand--what kind of money di4 
you see? 
A I saw green. To me it is bills. All Ballard showe4 
8
 I  me was change 
Q Now you went back and talked to Ballard again later,] 
correct? 
A Jeff Clark did. I didn't. 
12
 || Q Okay, you didn't. 
13
 || A I didn't talk to him. 
14
 " Q Did you ever find any bills on Mr. Ballard? 
A I didn't talk to--
Q Okay 
A Mr. Ballard 
Q When you talked to Mr. Ballard the first time, he 
said Mr. Hernandez owed him some money, and owed him a dollar. 
But he only had fifty cents, and gave him fifty cents, right? 
A That's what he said the first time, right 
Q Also in your report you said he pulled the money out] 
of his pocket. In fact in your report you didn't say which-
what--in your report you didn't say which pocket you saw Mr 
Ballard put the money in, is that correct? 
12| 
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A I didn't, no# not in my report. I know he put it ii| 
his left pocket. That's where he pulled it out of with his 
left hand. He pulled it out of the left pocket, the change. 
Q Where did he put the money Mr. Hernandez gave him? 
How do you know he put it in his right pocket instead of his 
left pocket. 
A Whatever he handed Mr. Ballard was--we didn't see. 
I  It was too small to see what he handed Mr. Ballard. I didn't 
see any money--what the object was Mr. Ballard put in his 
right pocket.. 
Q Okay. Now at that point do you stop and talk to Mr.| 
Ballard, or just Officer Clark? , 
A Clark did. I was just a side bailer. I was beside 
Jeff. I was on the left of Jeff. Jeff was at his bike. He 
was talking to Ballard. 
Q So you were there at that time. You heard what Mr. 
Ballard had to say? 
A Yeah. 
Q So you went up and talked to Mr. Hernandez, correct?| 
A That's correct. 
Q And he pulled a lot of items out of his pocket, 
correct? And you still saw something in his pants pocket. 
What did it look like when you saw it, the bulge in his 
pocket? 
A Something big and round. 
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Q Something big and round. How big? 
A Oh, it was pretty good--I don't know, whatever--
this big around, sticking up, bulging out of his pocket. I 
can't--
Q What kind of pants did he have on? 
A These tan, like a tan--they are big, bulky type 
pants. But they were tan pants. 
Q So was it tight or loose on him? 
A It wap loose. 
Q And you talked--and those pants are over in the--I 
imagine that's what he was wearing when he was booked into 
jail? 
A Pardon me? 
Q That's what he was wearing when he was booked into 
jail? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. You saw this bulge. How big a bulge was it? 
Was the pants fitting tightly or loosely? 
A No, they were loose. They were loose. They were 
loose pants. Probably a lot baggier than yours. And big, 
bulky, baggie pockets. I mean you could still see a bulge in 
it. To me it would have to be pretty big. 
Q Now, a film canister is about an inch and a half 
long and about, oh, three quarters to an inch in diameter? 
A No, they are bigger than that. Probably about, oh, 
141 
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an inch and three quarters in diameter. Probably two or threq 
inches long, some of them 
Q What size of film canister was this? Was it 35 
millimeter? 
|| A It was 35 millimeter. It wasn't like a--it is more 
like a Kodak film canister. If you get Fuji film, there is 
these really small white ones 
8
 || Q Are these black? 
A This is a big gray, black type 
Q Black type. Do you have it with you? 
11
 || A Pardon? 
12 H
 Q Do you have it with you, the film canister? Do you 
13
 || have it? 
A Do I have it with me? 
Q Yes 
A No. 
THE COURT: Would this help, Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: Well, that's not the same size either. 
Q You said you could see this bulge? 
A Right 
Q And what exactly did the bulge appear to be? 
A Something round. And you know, fairly long. I mean| 
I don't know if I am looking at the end of it or side, or 
what. 
Q You say fairly long. How long did it appear to be? 
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A Probably—well, looking, I think I was looking at 
head. The cap of i t was s t i c k i n g out . 
Q Explain when you sa id i t was s t i c k i n g out , where wa^ 
i t s t i c k i n g out? 
A Well, you could see i t was the round part of the caj} 
s t i c k i n g out . 
Q But you c o u l d n ' t - -
A Twisted in there or what. 
Q Twisted this way? 
A It wasn't twisted this way, but sideways. You coulc| 
see something round like this. 
Q Okay. Did you have any idea what that could be? 
A Did I? No, not until I grabbed it and felt it* 
Q But what did it appear to be before you grabbed it 
and felt it? 
A Could have been a gun as far as I know. It could 
have been a small caliber gun, with a pair of pants like that 
Q Did you have any reason to believe Mr. Hernandez hac| 
a gun? 
A Well, if I believed--I thought it was a drug deal. t\ 
lot of narcotics buys, and people using and selling are 
carrying weapons. That's why I--
Q Actually, did you believe Mr. Hernandez had a gun 
when you saw that bulge? 
A Yeah, I thought possibly it might be a gun. 
16| 
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Q You thought possibly it might be a gun, okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. PARMLEY: No other questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may stand down, Officer Hall. ThanJ^  
you. Is there a stipulation as to this person's identity? 
MR. PARMLEY: There is not. I can--
THE COURT: We got carried away with the 
stipulations, and I didn't know if that was at issue or not. 
MR. GRAVIS: I will stipulate to the identification, 
this is the same person. 
THE COURT: For purposes of the Prelim? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You will accept that? 
MR. PARMLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Parmley? 
MR. PARMLEY: No, your Honor. 
MR. GRAVIS: Call Officer Clark. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PARMLEY: Can Officer Hall stay where he is the 
primary officer in this case? 
MR. GRAVIS: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: You can stay. 
JEFF CLARK 
called as a witness, and having been first duly sworn, was 
1*71 
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examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, GRAVIS: 
Q State your full name for the record. 
Q Jeff Clark, Ogden City Police Officer. 
Q And drawing your attention to the 17th of April thi^ 
year, were you so employed? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And drawing your attention to approximately I 
believe it is 5:00 o'clock that day, were you on duty? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And where were you at? 
A 25th and Lincoln. 
Q Okay. Where--now when you first saw the Defendant, 
exactly where were you at? 
A I was on my bike crossing the intersection of 25th 
and Lincoln. 
Q All right, crossing the intersection of 25th and 
Lincoln. And what did you observe? 
A I saw several white males standing against the 
Marion Hotel along the sidewalk on the south side in the 100 
block. I saw two Hispanic males, transient type, walking 
westbound in front of the Marion on the south side in the 100 
block. 
Q Okay. What did you see--what did you observe after 
181 
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that? 
A I saw one of the white males standing against the 
Marion take his back off the Marion and step towards the two 
Hispanic transient type walking westbound. The Hispanic 
wearing the plaid flannel, which would be Sergio Hernandez, 
was the closest to the individual standing against the wall. 
The individual standing against the wall reached out as if he 
was talking to the suspect Hernandez. And Hernandez put his 
hand quickly into his pocket. He pulled it out and handed hinj 
something. The male standing against the Marion took it, 
grasped it, put it in his pocket. And Hernandez and the othezj 
Hispanic transient type continued westbound on 25th Street. 
Q Could you tell what the item was? 
A No. Small enough that it could be concealed within 
the palm of a hand. 
Q Okay. It was concealed within the palm of the hand?) 
A Yes. 
Q You couldn't see what it was? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Did you see Mr. Ballard hand the Defendant 
anything? 
A Excuse me? 
Q Did you see Mr. Ballard hand the Defendant anything?! 
A At that time, I wasn't sure who was handing who 
what. 
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Q So you j u s t saw one exchange. You d idn ' t see two 
exchanges? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. Then what did you do? 
A Myself and Officer Hall# we rode up to Mr. Ballard, 
who was the individual that we identified that stepped out and 
exchanged with Mr. Hernandez, and stopped and asked him do yoi| 
8
 || know this person. He said yes, I know him from St. Anne's. 
We both live down there. We said what changed hands? He saicj 
Mr. Hernandez owed me money. We said how much? He said a 
dollar. I asked him if I could have my dollar back. 
Hernandez said he didn't have the dollar, I only have 
approximately fifty cents in change. And that's what 
Hernandez gave me. And standing there talking to him— 
Q Now, what pocket did you see Mr. Ballard put the 
money--put the object in that Mr. Hernandez gave him? 
A I wasn't in a position to see clearly. I was 
against the building, probably almost in a direct line of Mr. 
Ballard. Like I said, there were several other individuals 
standing against the side of the building also. I am not sure| 
exactly, exactly which hand. 
Q Okay. Did you ask Mr. Ballard--did Mr. Ballard shovj 
you any money? 
A Yeah,- he reached into his pocket and pulled out a 
handful of change, which appeared to be more than fifty cents 
2d 
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Q Okay. What pocket did he pull that out of? 
A Let's see, it would be his right side. 
Q Pulled it out of his right pocket? 
A I am not sure. I am just--
Q Which pocket--which pocket do people normally carry 
change money in? 
A I normally carry it in my right pocket because I am 
right handed. 
Q Did you have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Ballard 
again later? 
Yes. 
Did he show you any money out of any different 
No. That was all the money in his pockets. 
Okay. 
On his person, in that pocket. 
Okay. Now after you talked to Mr. Ballard, did you 
Officer Hall when you stopped the Defendant? 
Yes. 
Okay. And you stopped the Defendant and the 
Defendant pulled various items out of his pocket, is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And after he had pulled those items out of his 
pocket what did you see, if anything? 
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A First of all, I couldn't see his pocket. Like I 
described, he had a black and white, large, oversized flannel 
shirt over a T-shirt. And that covered his waist and his 
pockets. 
Q Okay. So after he pulled everything out of his 
pockets, could you see his pockets? 
A Yeah, once the items starting coming out, I did see 
a large bulge in one of his pockets. 
Q And what did that bulge appear to be? 
A He pulled out a large wad of tissue paper. And 
while holding that tissue paper, he still had another large 
bulge in his pocket. 
Q What did that bulge appear to be? 
A It was a large round container, canister type. 
Q What's what it appeared to be when you were looking 
at his pockets? 
A Yes. That's the only thing I could think that it 
would look like for sure. Round. 
Q Okay. So it appeared to be a canister type 
something, is that correct? 
A Right. 
Q Didn't appear to be a weapon? 
A All I can say, it was large, round. I don't know 
whether it was a canister or weapon. I couldn't tell. 
Q It appeared to be a canister in your mind, right? 
22| 
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A No, not for sure. The reason why I say canister is 
because when he was patted down and I touched it, that's what 
it felt like. 
Q Okay. That was a film canister, right? 
A Once it was pulled out of the pocket, right. 
Q Do you ever carry film canisters around with you? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Nothing illegal about carrying a film canister, 
right ? 
A Commonly it is carried by people that possess 
narcotics and transport them. 
Q Also carried by people who take pictures, right? 
A Sure. 
MR. GRAVIS: Okay. I have nothing further[ 
MR. PARMLEY: No other questions. 
THE COURT: You may stand down, Officer, thank you. 
Any other witnesses, Mr. Gravis? 
MR. GRAVIS: No, your Honor. We will submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Parmley? 
All right. Would you please explain to Mr. Hernandez, at) 
least based on what I have heard, while there may be other 
issues that can be addressed, I am satisfied there is 
sufficient probable cause to order him held for trial on the 
matter. 
I assume, counsel, you will go back and get a date from 
23 
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Judge Dutson. And if you need to file any kind of Motions--
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, I would just let the Clerk know I 
will be wanting a copy of the transcript of this hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay, you will make a copy of the tape 
for the Public Defender's office. I assume either Melissa or 
Heather will be over to take that up. 
Anything else? The State want a copy? 
MR. PARMLEY: (Inaudible.) 
All right. With that then, this matter will be 
adjourned. And if you will take it back, Judge Dutson will be] 
able to get it on--do you want to go ahead with the 
arraignment, or do it all before Judge Dutson? 
MR. GRAVIS: Do it all in front of Judge Dutson. 
THE COURT: Very well. Deputy, if you will take the| 
original file back down, they will need that. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Gravis, this is your Motion. You 
may proceed. Is the Defendant here? 
THE CLERK: For the record, State vs. Sergio 
Hernandez, case number 971900515. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, it is my Motion, but it is 
the State's burden. They have the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the search was legal. 
THE COURT: Do you want them to proceed first? 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, then the State may proceed. 
MR. PARMLEY: Your Honor, we have broken our 
arguments into three parts as outlined in our brief opposing 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
THE COURT: Before we get into that, does either 
party anticipate calling any witnesses, presenting any 
additional evidence, or do you intend to submit--the Court had 
reviewed the file in this matter and has heard the case of thq 
Preliminary Hearing as it relates to the testimony of Officer 
Hall and Officer Clark, I believe. And that tape then has 
been given to the Clerk, that I listened to. 
Go ahead and proceed then. 
MR. PARMLEY: Your Honor, we have broken this into 
three parts. First of all, the initial stop itself we say was) 
justified. Really, we view the initial stop as more of a 
police officer-citizen encounter, rather than a level one 
251 
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stop. Officer Hall said he approached the Defendant and said 
excuse me, sir, can we approach you and talk to you about what} 
happened back there on the street? The Defendant said sure. 
Even if it went beyond the police-citizen encounter, the 
officer had reasonable suspicion under 77-17-15, and under 
Terry vs. Ohio, a peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed, or is in the act of committing, or is 
attempting to commit, a public offense. And may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Officer Hall has articulated very well that when he 
observed these two, he saw that--the green of money changing 
hands, and also saw the stuff that the subject hands something} 
to the one male standing next to the wall of the Marion. And 
saw that male then with that object in the palm of his hand 
reach down and put it into his right pocket. 
He immediately recognized that as having all the 
appearances of what he observed as a drug transaction. Two 
people meet on the street very briefly. That money changes 
hands. Something else changed hands. And then he saw the onej 
male put that into his pocket. He recognized that as what he 
believed to be a drug transaction. I think he articulated 
very well and reasonably why he believed that was a drug 
transaction. 
But he gathered additional facts before he even stopped 
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and talked to the Defendant. He approached Mr. Ballard and 
talked to him about what had happened. And Mr. Ballard at 
that time said, well he owed me about--he gave me fifty cents 
They asked Mr. Ballard to show them the money. He pulled 
fifty cents out of his left pocket according to Officer Hall. 
And Officer Clark wasn't able to articular that, he said he 
wasn't in a position he saw which pocket it was. But Officer 
Hall did articulate that, and knew,that the object that he wa^ 
concerned about, what he reasonable believed was the fruit of 
the drug transaction, had been put into Mr. Bauer's right 
pocket. 
So based upon that and the exchange he observed, he 
stopped and talked to the suspect, Mr. Hernandez. 
Now, the second part was he was checked for 
Identification. Asked if he had any weapons. The Defendant 
was cooperative. Started emptying his pockets at that point. 
But Officer Hall then sees remaining in the Defendant's pocketj 
a bulge. He sees a cylindrical round shape bulging up there 
in the pocket. The Defendant was wearing baggie pants. It is 
apparent that he has got something in his pocket. The 
Defendant denied there is anything else in his pocket, yet 
Officer Hall could see there was something remaining in the 
pockets. 
Not only that, Officer Hall had seen what he interpreted 
as a drug transaction. And in his experience people who are 
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involved with narcotics often carry weapons. Given that, and 
the Defendant's denial there was anything else in his pockets,] 
Officer Hall reasonably believed that the Defendant may be 
armed. And may pose a threat to the officer's safety, or 
others. And then a pat down for weapons. And during the pat 
down for weapons, he feels not a gun, but he feels what he 
immediately recognizes as a film canister. 
The pat down leading to that discovery was reasonable anc| 
justified under the law under Terry versus Ohio and the Utah 
Code 77-7-16, which reads a peace officer who has stopped a 
person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for 
dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger. 
Now, that takes us to part three where Officer Hall then 
reaches into the suspect's pocket to remove the film canister.] 
Was that constitutionally permissible? 
The main authority on this is a United States Supreme 
Court case called Minnesota vs. Dickerson that articulated 
what the Court calls the plain feel doctrine. And in that 
case, the Court reasons that if the peace officer lawfully 
pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose| 
contour or mass makes the identity immediately apparent, and 
there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond 
that already authorized by the pat down for weapons, and if 
the object is contraband, the warrantless seizure is justified 
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In this case Officer Hall, in patting down the suspect, 
immediately recognizes the identity of this object as a film 
canister• This is something which he has had a lot of 
experience with. He knows what a film canister feels like. 
But beyond that, Officer Hall knows from his experience that 
film canisters are very> very often used by people who use 
narcotics to contain their controlled substance. 
A similar case to the case of Minnesota vs. Dickerson wa^ 
State vs. Rushing. This is simply persuasive authority, I 
suppose. It is the Supreme Court of Missouri. And in that 
case--which is very, very similar to the case before this 
Court. The Officer had reason to believe that the drug 
transaction may have occurred. He had done a pat down and 
recognized what they called a candy container, a lifesaver 
hold--or candy container, or something like that. And he 
removed that. The Court in State vs. Rushing said Lifesaver 
candy containers, plastic baggies, film canisters and other 
types of containers that are easily concealed in a pockets anc( 
are easily openable for removal of items, that it is 
immediately apparent in that case as a candy container and 
knowing that drugs are often stored in such candy containers, 
combined with the officer's knowledge of suspicious 
transactions, there was probable cause for the seizure of the 
item from the suspect's pocket. 
Now, it is not always going to be a film canister, 
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obviously. Sometimes it is going to be a baggie. Sometimes 
it is going to be a paper bindle. In just about any case that} 
you can imagine where the officer feels something that he 
recognizes as a bindle or baggie or a film canister, there 
could be the argument made that this could possibly be 
carrying something legitimate. Just as in this case, a film 
canister could be perfectly lawfully used to carry film. A 
baggie could be perfectly lawful and used to carry--or simply 
in a person's pocket. Or something that has the feel of a 
baggie, and yet be a perfectly lawful item. A candy dispense^ 
may be perfectly lawful. But that doesn't mean that an 
officer who is able to identify the item by his touch through 
the clothing, and who has reason to believe that a drug 
transaction has occurred, doesn't have probable cause to take 
that item from the pocket. He does, coupled with all those 
other things, even though there may be a legitimate 
explanation for somebody having that item in their pocket. 
In this case that's exactly what Officer Hall has 
articulated, that he saw all the indices 6f a drug transaction 
on the street. The Defendant was denying there was anything 
remaining in the pocket, even when it was readily apparent to 
Officer Hall there was something there. So the indices of a 
drug transaction, the Defendant's denial that there was 
anything else in his pocket, the claim that he had removed 
everything from his pocket, and then Officer Hall immediately 
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recognizing the film canister. And knowing that in the 
hundreds of arrests he does a film canister, 95 percent of the| 
time I believe he said, he discovered do not contain film. 
But are either empty, contain a residue or a controlled 
substance. That certainly gave him probable cause under the 
authority of Minnesota vs. Dickerson to reach into the 
Defendant's pocket at that time and remove it. 
We believe that the stop, the pat down, and the intrusiorj 
and the removing of the film canister were all lawful under 
the constitution of the United States and the State of Utah. 
And ask the Court in this case to deny the Defendant's Motion 
to suppress. 
Thank you. 
MR. GRAVIS: It is our position that the detention 
is not based upon reasonable suspicion. The officer--Officer 
Hall went up and asked him if he could talk to him about what 
happened. That may be consensual. That may be a level one 
consensual police-citizen action. But at the point of time he-
starts doing the frisk, that becomes a level two stop which 
requires reasonable suspicion the Defendant is engaged in 
criminal activity. 
You have heard the testimony of both officer Hall and 
Officer Clark as to what they observed. And there is some 
discrepancy as to what they observed, particularly whether Mr 
Bauer passed anything to the Defendant. I think one of the 
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most telling things there is the description of what they are 
looking for. A transient looking Hispanic male, which there 
is a lot of Hispanic males on 25th Street on any given day. 
That's what they are looking for. 
More importantly when they talk to Mr. Ballard, if they 
have a reasonable suspicion a drug transaction had just 
occurred, they didn't pat him down. They asked him what 
happened. He pulled the money out of his pocket. Officer 
Hall said well it isn't the same pocket. But they didn't go 
go pat him down. 
Officer Hall says people engaged in drug activity, 
possession or sales, routinely are armed, and therefore that 
gives him grounds to frisk people who he believes are engaged 
in drug transactions. He didn't pat Mr. Ballard down. So I 
submit he didn't have reasonable suspicion. If he had had 
reasonable suspicion, he would have patted Mr. Ballard down. 
He patted Mr. Hernandez down because he was a Hispanic 
male. And whatever a transient looking Hispanic male is, he 
decided he was. 
More importantly, the other item is the pat down has to 
be based upon a reasonable suspicion the Defendant is 
presently armed and dangerous and presents a threat to the 
officer or to another. I submit if the officer allowed the 
Defendant to reach in his pockets and pull items out of his 
pocket, he did not reasonably believe he was armed and 
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dangerous and presented a danger to the Officer or others. Hd[ 
allowed Mr. Hernandez to reach in his pocket. So when he saw 
the bulge in there, if he was worried it was a weapon--he 
wasn't, because he had just--knowing the drug activity there, 
because as I say he allowed Mr. Hernandez to rummage through 
his pockets looking for identification. It wasn't a 
reasonable suspicion he was armed and dangerous and presented 
a danger to the officer or anyone else. 
He saw a bulge there. He wanted to know what it was, so 
he patted him down. He started patting him down and feels a 
film canister. 
Now, the State has correctly stated Minnesota vs. 
Dickerson, which says the object's incriminating character is 
immediately apparent. The question now becomes whether the 
film canister's incriminating character is immediately 
apparent. 
Officer Hall says yeah, a lot of drug people have them, 
use them to carry drugs. Sometimes they are empty. Sometimes] 
they have drugs. Sometimes they have residue. Officer Hall 
admits he possesses several film canisters. They are not 
illegal to possess. If they fcre, it is up to Mr. Hall to say 
what agency (inaudible) them. 
A film canister is not per se contraband. The State in 
their memorandum cites the Rushing case, which is out of 
Missouri. I got a copy of the State's brief yesterday 
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afternoon. I had an opportunity to read the Rushing case. 
In reviewing the case, the facts of the case are 
different than this case. I believe that's one of the 
important things we need to consider. In Rushing, what 
happened is that a juvenile probation officer is driving down 
the street, and he was blocked. The traffic was actually 
blocked by a car in front of him, where the Defendant was--th^ 
car was blocking traffic. Was not parked. The Defendant was 
on the driver's side of the car conversing with the driver. 
He looked both ways, looked around to see if anyone was 
watching. And then he reached into his back pocket and handec| 
something to the driver, or appeared to hand something to the 
driver. The driver handed something back-to the Defendant, 
who put that object in his pocket. 
In this case we don't have those things. Plus, this is aj 
situation where the Defendant is walking down the street. Mr 
Ballard talks to him. They talk for a minute. There is no 
looking around. Not the mutual passing of objects back and 
forth. And then the probation officer calls the police, the 
policeman came, and they found a lifesaver hole container. 
This appears to be a minority decision. Minority in the 
other courts that have had an opportunity to brief and 
opportunity to review several cases, some of the cases that 
were contained in the dissent in the Rushing case, 
particularly one Campbell vs. State, which is 864 SW 2nd 223, 
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Texas appellate decision, where they specifically held that a 
film canister, feeling a film cannister itself was not--that 
was not immediately apparent that that was incriminating 
evidence. And it was not admissible under plain feel. 
Another case, Commonwealth vs. Stackfield, it is a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, which the Court said 
feeling a zip-lock bag in the Defendant's pocket was not 
immediately apparent because it could be--it could contain 
drugs or be the remainder of the Defendant's lunch. 
I submit another Pennsylvania case, interest of BC, which| 
is a 1966 Supreme Court case, where there was a feeling of a 
bag in the pants--in the waistband of sweatpants. In that 
case the officer had already seen the bag, seen the Defendant 
showing it to a woman. Saw it contained individual packets, 
and saw the zip-lock bag. (inaudible) So prior to patting 
him down, he had actually seen the item and believed it 
contained--based upon his sight, plain view, that it contained] 
contraband. 
State vs. Cline, which was a Connecticut Supreme Court 
case in 1996, the officer felt the pocket, felt a hard rock-
like object or plastic, and heard the sound of plastic 
crunching as he found it. He identified it as a rock. But 
this was again--this was a rock cocaine. But this was a 
search incident to the execution of a search warrant in a dru^ 
house. And the Defendant was in the house when the search 
33 
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warrant was being executed. 
And people vs. Champion--
THE COURT: In that one did they allow--
MR. GRAVIS: They allowed it in. Like I say--
THE COURT: That was under those circumstances? 
MR. GRAVIS: Under those circumstances. People vs 
Champion, which is a Michigan Supreme Court case in 1996. 
This is a pill bottle. The Court allowed it in. But they 
said you had to look at the totality of the circumstances. 
In this case what they said was the officer had seen somej 
activity involving other persons. And they saw a person 
talking to the Defendant in the car. The Defendant, when he 
saw the officers, got out of the car and started walking away 
The officers were acquainted with the Defendant who had prior 
drug and weapons convictions. They were in a high drug crime 
area. The Defendant had his hands in the front of his 
sweatpants. And the officer told him to remove his hands. He| 
refused to remove his hands from his sweatpants. And then 
they found the pill bottle in the crotch area of the 
sweatpants. 
The Defendant had pockets in the sweatpants. The pill 
bottle was actually shoved down inside the front of his pants 
in the crotch area, the groin area. The Court went on to say 
if the pill bottle had been in the pockets, the results may 
have been different. In the pocket instead of his crotch 
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area. Or if he didn't have any pockets, that may have made 
some difference. So they looked at the totality of the entire] 
circumstances. And particularly where the pill bottle was. 
And Commonwealth vs. Crowther, which is out of Kentucky. 
The officer felt what he thought was a drug bindle, and 
described it felt like a small gum ball. They said well 
that's—if it felt like a small gum ball, you can't reach into) 
his pocket and pull it out. 
The Utah Court of Appeals or Supreme Court has not had 
any cases involving the plain feel. So we are not sure where 
the Utah Court will come down. 
I he Rushing case is a minority position based or| 
the other cases I have been able to find. But Officer Hall 
does not know what was in that film container until he sees 
it, pulls it out and opens the lid. So the incriminating 
character is not immediately apparent. He does not know it 
has drugs in it, if it is empty, has film in. He just feels 
the film container. And he was even able to identify what thej 
film container was. 
And going back to the prior argument, he wasn't afraid 
that it was a weapon. He saw the bulge. Now he testified it 
could have been a weapon, or could have been something else. 
But he had allowed the Defendant to put his hands in his 
pockets. If he had really believed the Defendant was armed 
and dangerous, he never would have allowed the Defendant to 
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put his hands in his pockets to start with. 
So we submit that the search is illegal. And the items 
seized should be suppressed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parmley. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PARMLEY: Yes# your Honor. _I would like to 
respond to a couple of points Mr. Gravis has made. 
He has suggested that Rushing is a minority case because 
of the cases that he has found where the Court has denied the 
admission of evidence. He talked about the film canister. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of a zip-lock bag. 
The small gum ball. 
The language that he read that I am remembering was he 
said the zip-lock bag itself. And I can't remember what the 
words were exactly# but the film canister per se. Or a small 
gum ball per se. I think that's correct. If Norm Hall for 
some other reason was having some sort of contact with the 
Defendant and patted him down and detected what appeared to bel 
a film canister, I don't know that it would have been a proper] 
seizure. But you have to look at all of the circumstances. 
You have to look at the totality of the circumstances in 
deciding if there is probable cause for further intrusion. 
Just as Mr. Gravis has said# the Texas Court, I believe 
it was, said that the totality of circumstances becomes 
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important. And that is also what the Court in State vs. 
Rushing said. They said that the officer had knowledge of th^ 
suspicious transaction. And that was coupled with his 
knowledge of the candy containers commonly used to store 
drugs. And that's why in that case it was allowed. 
In the case before this Court, Officer Hall has detailed 
numerous concerns about what he had seen taking place on the 
street. He has detailed what happened when he stopped and he 
was talking to the suspect. And then we have another factor 
that's added to this as well. And that's the Defendant's 
refusal to remove that item from his pocket when he was 
voluntarily taking everything out of his pocket to show 
Officer Hall. In response to Officer Hall's question do you 
have any weapons on you or identification, the defendant 
starts removing everything from his pockets. Officer Hall cas| 
see the bulge. Asked the Defendant what's that? Would you 
remove that? The Defendant refuses to. And denies there is 
anything there. 
Officer Hall has knowledge of the suspicious transaction 
on the street. The Defendant's refusal to take that item front 
his pocket. Officer Hall in doing the pat down recognizes the) 
item immediately as a film canister, and knows what they are 
typically used for. 
Now# at that point he has articulated far more suspicion 
than just, well I felt a film canister. And at that point he 
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has articulated probable cause. Reaches in and removes it. 
I hardly know how to respond to the argument that the patj 
down was just because this person is Hispanic. I think that 
when Officer Hall has articulated so many details of this 
transaction, that that argument hardly warrants response. 
Officer Hall has said that they have got the report of 
transient type Hispanic males in the area. But that isn't, 
what initiates Officer Hall and Officer Clark believing that 
they had just seen a drug transaction. Officer Hall put into 
words very well what he had seen as far as the exchange, the 
brief encounter on the street. The buyer saying well it was 
just a matter of my getting fifty cents from him, and reaching 
into his left pocket and taking out fifty cents, when Officer 
Hall saw very clearly that man f Mr. Ballard, putting whatever 
it was he got into his right hand pocket. All of that is the 
reason for his suspicion. 
And finally, the argument that he didn't pat Mr. Ballard 
down and he trusted the Defendant to allow the Defendant to be| 
pulling stuff out of his pockets, therefore Officer Hall 
didn't have reasonatble suspicion to believe that the Defendant] 
might have a weapon or believe that the Defendant may be a 
danger to himself or anybody else. Well, the Officer on the 
street walks a real fine line in deciding when he is going to 
pat down for weapons and when he is not. The fact that he 
doesn't immediately pat down for a weapon doesn't wipe out 
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1 what suspicion he already has. The point when he chooses to 
2 put down for weapons is when he can see that bulge, and when 
3 the Defendant refuses to produce it. And at that point, 
4 Officer Hall's suspicions are such that he feels he needs to 
5 pat the suspect down, and does so. 
6 The fact that he didn't do it sooner, or didn't do it to 
7 Mr. Ballard, doesn't wipe out the reasonable suspicion that hd 
may have been--that he may have been gathering throughout the 
g II entire transaction. And the point the Defendant refuses to 
identify what that bulge is in his pocket, in fact denies 
there is anything in there, that's when Officer Hall's 
suspicion rises to the point that he believes that the 
Defendant may be armed and may be a danger to himself or 
others. 
I think that out on the street it is entirely reasonable 
and prudent for Officer Hall to conduct the pat down in those 
17 II circumstances. And what he then discovers subsequent to that, 
18 || I have already argued as proper and constitutionally 
19 ]| justified, your Honor. 
20 II Thank you. 
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MR. GRAVIS: Briefly, your Honor, I would submit the 
cases I cited were all cases involving questions about whether] 
there was a reasonable suspicion. And the Courts have got to 
24 pass that question to determine whether or not the plain, feel 
doctrine would allow it in or not allow it in. 
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In talking about the Rushing case being a minority, you 
have also got the case out of Illinois that talked about the 
case of People vs. Champion when they looked at the totality 
of the circumstances and said the big difference was where the) 
pill bottle was found. These cases that all revolve on 
questions whether there is reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
pat down or not. 
But more importantly, your Honor, the State is saying, 
well, I don't know how to respond about the Hispanic issue. 
Well, Mr. Hernandez is a Hispanic. He may be a transient. I 
don't know what a transient looking Hispanic male looks like. 
But he was on 25th Street. He had a conversation with a white! 
individual. And this transaction occurred between Mr. Bauer, 
who is a white individual, and Mr. Hernandez, a Hispanic. The) 
officer did not search Mr. Ballard. 
Based upon Officer Hall's own testimony, people who are 
involved in drugs are routinely armed and dangerous, that's 
why he patted down Mr. Hernandez. But he never patted down 
Mr. Ballard. Mr. Ballard allegedly pulled the change out of 
his left pocket, not the pocket he put the object into. 
There is some things there too. They had already talked 
to Mr. Ballard before they went and talked to Mr. Hernandez, 
and heard this was not a drug transaction. If they were going] 
to pat down Mr. Hernandez, they should have patted down Mr. 
Ballard. If they had a reasonable suspicion to pat him down, 
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they had a reasonable suspicion to pat Mr. Ballard down. 
Also, because he pulled the object out of his pocket 
does not give them reasonable suspicion that's a weapon. It 
gives them a reasonable suspicion or a hunch he has something 
in there he doesn't want the officer to see. Whether that's 
weapon or contraband or whatever, he doesn't have to pull it 
out of his pocket. The officer can only pat him down if he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe it is a weapon and feel^ 
it is a danger to the officer or others. 
In this case he allowed the Defendant to rummage in his 
pockets prior to the pat down. In fact the pat down is based 
upon the fact he didn't pull that out. I submit if he had 
believed he was armed and dangerous, he would have patted him 
down first. 
So it is our position, like I say, that there is no 
reasonable suspicion he was armed and dangerous. The fact he 
wouldn't pull the object out doesn't give rise to reasonable 
suspicion he is armed and dangerous. It rises to the 
suspicion he had something in his pocket he didn't want the 
officer to see. If he had a weapon, he could have pulled it 
out when he stuck his hands in there at first. 
Thank you. We submit it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
This case involves the issue as to what is permissible 
police intrusion into people's lives. And it is a very 
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important constitutional issue. We live in a society where 
normally there is no right of a police officer to interfere 
with our normal activity, unless there is a reasonable basis 
to do so. And so this question centers around that important 
issue. 
Terry vs. Ohio is probably one of the earlier cases that 
clarified general broad circumstances for police contact, and 
any involvement or questioning. Our Supreme Court has gone on* 
to quite clearly define the level and what is needed at 
different levels to justify additional police intrusion into 
anyone's lives. 
The level one stop is basically a Terry type permissible 
involvement. You need very little. A level two, where you 
get to the point where there may end up being a seizure, of 
course requires articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
And then the level three which justifies the search or arrest 
is the highest level. 
And as has been stated by both parties, we have to look 
at a totality of the circumstances. It is real interesting in] 
these areas that the courts seem to jump back and forth as to 
whose point of view we are looking at. For example, in a 
Terry stop, we are looking—and even in a level two stop, we 
are looking at whether or not a person still has the freedom 
to leave. And we look at it from that person's, the victim's 
or the suspect's point of view, or the ordinary citizen's 
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point of view. 
But there are points in time when an officer looking for 
criminal activity, we look at the activity from his point of 
view, as to what's reasonable from the officer's point of vietf 
in proceeding. So we do have to look at the totality of the 
circumstances. 
Now, the Court finds in this case that the officers 
initially saw what appeared to be a suspicious transaction. 
That this was a possible drug type of exchange that is quite 
commonly observed, or had been quite commonly observed, by 
this particular officer in this area. That there had been 
complaints and a nebulous type of definition of people that atj 
the present time were currently involved using a very vague 
term about transient Hispanic. I don't know the difference 
between a transient Hispanic or a Hispanic that's been 
working, or someone that hasn't shaved, or how you might use 
that term transient. But it did involve a claim that certain 
Hispanic appearing males had been exchanging drugs in that 
area. 
And the record would reflect that this Defendant is an 
olive skinned Hispanic appearing person. But again, that's 
still a pretty vague kind of a definition, because that isn't 
too clear. But in any event, there had been complaints about 
drug transactions in this area by Hispanic appearing males. 
One of the circumstances that is quite damning to--or at 
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least supportive of the officer's conduct in this case 
after he made the initial inquiry of Bauer or Ballard, or 
whatever the gentleman's name was, he was obviously giving 
some false information that he knew was false, because he had 
seen the transaction and had seen a bill or a greenback or 
currency transferred. And that was from a different pocket. 
And that Bauer or Ballard was obviously not telling him 
accurately what he had observed. 
That created additional suspicion it appears in the 
officer's mind that caused him then to pursue this further 
with Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez then, after the officer had} 
articulable suspicion that there was criminal activity, was 
approached and asked if he had any weapons. And I don't 
recall if he was asked if he had drugs or identification. Butj 
I believe he was asked some further questions besides weapons. 
And Mr. Hernandez then began to take things out of his pocketsj 
in the presence of the officer. And said he had everything 
out, when it was obvious that he did not. There was obviously 
still something in his pocket. 
A continuing suspicion then, and a greater suspicion 
obviously was developing when he kept saying, when it was 
obvious that everything was out of his pocket, that he still 
had this bulging container of some sort, or item in his 
pocket. That a pat down revealed to an officer who said that 
he had frequently observed canisters such as this being used 
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by drug dealers from his prior experience for containing the 
drugs that they are selling. And he thought that it might be 
a weapon. 
The Court believes that it was appropriate then for him 
to enter into the pocket and seize the item. And the 
suspicion had raised to the level where he was justified in 
confiscating and examining that item. And found it to have 
what it appeared to be drugs. 
The Motion to Suppress this evidence is denied. The 
Court believes that the officer under the totality of the 
circumstances was justified in the intrusion that he made in 
this particular case. And that he complied with the 
requirements of Utah law and the constitutions of Utah and the| 
United States in the seizure of the evidence. 
So that will be admissible, if otherwise admissible in 
the forthcoming case. 
MR. PARMLEY: Your Honor f we are set for trial--
MR. GRAVIS: Set for pre-trial. Just a minute. 
THE COURT: I am going to recess this case briefly. 
We have another little hearing. 
(Recess taken.) 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, this was also the time set 
for pre-trial. At this time it is Mr. Hernandez' position it 
cannot be resolved. We are looking for a trial date on the 
5th of June a 9:30 in the morning. 
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STATE of Missouri, Respondent, 
v. 
Shaun Alexander RUSHING, Appellant. 
No. 78838. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, 
En Banc. 
Nov. 19,1996. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1996. 
Defendant was convicted, in the Circuit Court, 
Cape Girardeau County, John W. Grimm, J., of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, and he appealed from denial of motion to 
suppress evidence. Appeal was transferred to the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, Holstein, 
C.J., held that seizure of crack cocaine was 
authorized under plain feel exception to warrant 
requirement. 
Affirmed. 
Covington, J., dissented and filed separate opinion 
in which White, J., joined. 
[1] ARREST <®=>63.5(4) 
35k63.5(4) 
Investigative stop is permitted under Fourth 
Amendment when law enforcement officer is able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
with rational inference from those facts, create 
reasonable suspicion that person has or is about to 
commit crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[2] ARREST <®=*63.5(8) 
35k63.5(8) 
Once valid stop has been made, police may pat 
suspect's outer clothing if they have reasonable, 
particularized suspicion that suspect is armed; 
purpose of this limited search is not to discover 
evidence of crime, but to allow officer to pursue his 
investigation without fear of violence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
[3] ARREST <§=*63.5(9) 
35k63.5(9) 
Officer had probable cause, based on his knowledge 
of suspicious transaction deserved by another 
officer, based on reputation of neighborhood as drug 
trafficking area, and based on his knowledge of 
commonly used drug containers, to believe that 
cylindrical object discovered during pat-down search 
contained contraband; thus, officer did not exceed 
bis authority, under Terry and under and plain feel 
exception to warrant requirement, in seizing pill 
tottle from suspect. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; 
V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 1, § 15. 
[4] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*1144.12 
110kll44.12 
Denial of motion to suppress is reviewed only to 
determine whether evidence was sufficient to 
support ruling, and facts and reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom are to be stated favorably to order 
challenged on appeal. 
[4] CRIMINAL LAW <®=*1158(4) 
HOkl 158(4) 
Denial of motion to suppress is reviewed only to 
determine whether evidence was sufficient to 
support ruling, and facts and reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom are to be stated favorably to order 
challenged on appeal. 
[5] ARREST <S=>63.5(9) 
35k63.5(9) 
To justify seizure under plain-feel doctrine, officer 
must have probable cause to believe that item felt is 
contraband. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[6] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>40.1 
349k40.1 
"Probable cause" exists when facts and 
circumstances within knowledge of seizing officer 
are sufficient to warrant person of reasonable 
caution to believe that item may be contraband or 
other evidence of crime. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
4. 
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial 
constructions and definitions. 
[7] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>40.1 
349k40.1 
Officer's factual knowledge, based on law 
enforcement experience, is relevant to probable 
cause determination. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[8] CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW <®=>18 
92kl8 
Provisions of State Constitution may be construed to 
provide more expansive protections than comparable 
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federal constitutional provisions. 
[9] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES <®=>12 
349kl2 
State and federal constitutional protections from 
unreasonable searches and seizures are coextensive. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 
1, § 15. 
[10] ARREST <®=»63.5(9) 
35k63.5(9) 
Plain-feel doctrine comports with state constitutional 
protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; V.A.M.S. 
Const. Art. 1, § 15. 
•31 Gary E. Brotherton, Asst. Public Defender, 
Columbia, for appellant. 
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, 
Christine M. Blegen, Assistant Attorney General, 
Jefferson City, for respondent. 
HOLSTEIN, Chief Justice. 
Shaun Rushing was convicted and sentenced to five 
years in prison for possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute in violation of § 
195.211, RSMo 1994. The trial court overruled 
Rushing's motion to suppress the evidence of 
cocaine seized both before his arrest during a 
"patdown" search and after arrest. Rushing 
appealed his conviction. The Missouri Court of 
Appeals, Eastern District, believing the case to 
present a question of general interest and 
importance, transferred the case to this Court 
pursuant to article V, § 10, of the Missouri 
Constitution. The decision of the trial court is 
affirmed. 
I. 
On October 12, 1994, Randall Rhodes, the chief 
juvenile officer for the 32nd Judicial Circuit, was 
driving on South Lorimier Street in Cape Girardeau 
when he encountered a car blocking his lane. The 
car was sitting in front of an apartment building 
known as "brick city," an area that Rhodes 
characterized as being known for drug trafficking 
and gang activity. Rhodes saw a man, whom he 
later identified as the defendant, Rushing, standing 
next to the driver's side door of the car. As Rhodes 
slowly drove around the car, he observed Rushing 
look in all directions, reach into his front pants at 
the belt area, and then reach into the car as though 
he had something in his hand. Then Rhodes saw the 
driver of the car hand something to Rushing, who 
appeared to put the object in his pants pocket. 
Based on his training and experience as a juvenile 
officer, Rhodes believed that he had witnessed a 
drug transaction. He went to the police station and 
reported the incident to Rick Price, a narcotics 
officer. Officer Price went to the area of the 
suspected drug transaction with Rhodes. Rhodes 
recognized Rushing on the front porch of 216 South 
Lorimier Street and pointed him out to Officer 
Price. Officer Price testified that he had previously 
executed search warrants at both 212 and 216 South 
Lorimier for drugs. 
They parked the car, and Rhodes and Officer Price 
approached Rushing. Two other men were with 
Rushing. Officer Price identified himself as a police 
officer. Officer Price told the men that he had 
received information that Rushing was dealing 
drugs. Rushing denied this allegation. The other 
men left the porch and departed in different 
directions. 
Officer Price testified that gang graffiti was present 
in the neighborhood, which caused him concern for 
his safety. Officer Price stated that, out of a 
concern for his safety and the safety of Mr. Rhodes, 
he conducted a patdown for "weapons and 
contraband." During the patdown, Officer Price ran 
his hand down Rushing's front pants pocket and felt 
a tubular item. Officer Price testified that he 
immediately thought that the item was a tubular 
plastic "Life Saver Hole candy container, which is a 
common container used by crack dealers to carry 
their crack cocaine in." Officer Price testified that 
he thought the container held crack cocaine. He 
based this belief on the information received from 
Rhodes, the area they were in, and his previous 
training and experience. Officer Price further 
explained that in his experience drugs are commonly 
carried in medicine bottles, "Life Saver Hole" candy 
•32 containers, plastic baggies, film canisters and 
other similar types of containers that are easily 
concealed in a pocket and are easily opened for 
removal of items. 
Officer Price then removed the item from 
Rushing's pocket and discovered it to be a 
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cylindrical plastic medicine bottle, two and three-
fourths inches long, having a diameter of one inch. 
[FN1] The bottle contained ten rocks of crack 
cocaine and some rice. Rushing was then arrested 
and taken to police headquarters, where the police 
found a wadded dollar bill containing more crack 
cocaine in the watch pocket of Rushing*s pants. 
FN1. Defendant does not contend, and nothing in 
the record suggests, that the size and shape of the 
medicine bottle seized is different from a "Life 
Saver Hole" candy container. 
Rushing moved to suppress the introduction of the 
cocaine into evidence. After conducting a hearing, 
the trial court denied the motion. 
n. 
[1][2] An investigative stop is permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment when a law enforcement officer 
is able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken with rational inference from those 
facts, create a reasonable suspicion that a person has 
or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889 (1968). Once a valid stop has been made, 
police may pat a suspect's outer clothing if they 
have a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the 
suspect is armed. Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. "The 
purpose of this limited search is not to discover 
evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue 
his investigation without fear of violence.../ 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 
1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). 
[3] Rushing does not challenge the trial court's 
finding that the police were justified under Terry in 
stopping him and frisking him for weapons. Rather, 
Rushing contends that in seizing the pill bottle 
containing cocaine, Officer Price exceeded the scope 
of the limited intrusion authorized by Terry. Thus, 
the dispositive question is whether Officer Price was 
acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at 
the time he gained probable cause to believe that the 
item in Rushing's pants pocket contained 
contraband. 
In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.* 366, 113 
S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), the Supreme 
Court approved the "plain-feel" exception to the 
warrant requirement. The court reasoned that if "a 
police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer 
clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass 
makes its identity immediately apparent, there has 
been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond 
that already authorized by the officer's search for 
weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless 
seizure would be justified...." Id. at 375-76, 113 
S.Ct. at 2137. The court concluded that the search 
in Dickerson exceeded the scope of Terry because 
the incriminating character of the object felt was not 
immediately apparent to the officer. Id. at 379, 113 
S.Ct. at 2139. The court emphasized that "the 
officer determined that the lump was contraband 
only after 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise 
manipulating the contents of the defendant's 
pocket'-a pocket which the officer already knew 
contained no weapon." Id. at 378, 113 S.Ct. at 
2138 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 
844 (Minn. 1992)). 
[4] Conversely, in the present case the trial court 
overruled the motion to suppress because it found 
that the incriminating character of the object felt was 
immediately apparent to Officer Price. In reviewing 
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, we 
look only to determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the ruling. State v. Burkhardt, 
795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990). The facts 
and reasonable inferences arising therefrom are to 
be stated favorably to the order challenged on 
appeal. State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Mo. 
banc 1985), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698, 107 
S.Ct. 1596, 94 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987). It is not this 
court's province to substitute its discretion for that 
of the trial court. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d at 404. 
According to his testimony, Officer Price's first 
impression was that the object was a container of 
crack cocaine; there was no further manipulation of 
the object. Officer *33 Price testified that upon 
feeling the object, he "immediately thought that it 
was ... a Life Saver Hole candy container, which is 
a common container used by crack dealers to carry 
their crack cocaine in." He believed that the 
container held crack cocaine because of the 
surrounding circumstances and his training and 
experience as a police officer. Officer Price 
testified: "Because of the information I received 
from Officer Rhodes, the area we were in, and from 
my previous training and experiences in arresting 
crack dealers, [I knew] that that's what they cany 
their crack cocaine in." In ruling on the motion to 
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suppress, the trial court also considered a list of 
cocaine arrests and seizures of the Cape Girardeau 
Police Department, which was prepared by Officer 
Price and admitted into evidence at the suppression 
hearing. The list consisted of the complaint or 
report number and the type of container in which the 
crack cocaine was found. This evidence, taken as a 
whole, is sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding that at the moment Officer Price felt the 
item, it was immediately identifiable as contraband 
and was, therefore, subject to seizure. 
[5][6][7] The Supreme Court has equated the 
requirement that an item in plain view or feel be 
"immediately apparent" as contraband or other 
evidence of a crime with the probable cause 
standard. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
376, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 
(1993); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 
S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 
1542-43, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). 
Thus, to justify a seizure under the plain-feel 
doctrine, the officer must have probable cause to 
believe that the item felt is contraband. Probable 
cause exists when the facts and circumstances within 
the knowledge of the seizing officer are sufficient to 
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe 
that the item may be contraband or other evidence of 
a crime. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 
S.Ct. at 1543 (plurality opinion); State v. 
Hornbeck, 492 S.W.2d at 802, 805 (Mo. 1973). 
Relevant to this determination is the officer's factual 
knowledge, based on his law enforcement 
experience. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 
742-43, 103 S.Ct. at 1543-44 (plurality opinion). 
The facts recited above would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that drugs were present in the 
container felt by Officer Price. In sum, the 
following elements properly support a finding that 
Officer Price had probable cause to conclude that 
Rushing was carrying cocaine before he seized the 
container: 1) the officer's feel of the object, 2) his 
knowledge of the suspicious transaction observed by 
Rhodes, 3) the reputation of the neighborhood as a 
drug trafficking area, and 4) his knowledge of 
commonly used drug containers. 
There is sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
probable cause even though Officer Price felt the 
container rather than the cocaine itself. In the 
analogous plain-view context, a plurality of the 
United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown 
dismissed as "all but irrelevant" the officer's 
inability to see through the opaque fabric of a seized 
balloon believed to contain cocaine. Id. at 743, 103 
S.Ct. at 1543-44. In determining that the officer 
had probable cause to seize the balloon, the Brown 
plurality relied on the officer's testimony that he was 
aware, both from previous narcotics arrests and 
from discussions with other officers, that balloons 
tied in the manner of the one possessed by the 
defendant were frequently used to cany narcotics. 
Id. at 742-43, 103 S.Ct. at 1543-44. Similarly, in 
the present case, Officer Price testified that, because 
of his training and experience, he knew that the type 
of container he felt was frequently used to carry 
cocaine. The distinctive character of the container 
itself revealed its probable contents to the trained 
officer. Thus, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding 
that Officer Price had probable cause to believe that 
the container held cocaine before he put his hand 
into Rushing's pocket. 
m. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Dickerson established that the plain-feel doctrine 
does not offend guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Nevertheless, Rushing asks this Court to reject the 
plain-feel doctrine *34 as violating article I, § 15 of 
the Missouri Constitution. 
[8][9] Article I, § 15 of the Missouri Constitution 
provides that "the people shall be secure in their 
persons, papers, homes and effects, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures...." This 
provision parallels the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, which preserves "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures...." Provisions of our state 
constitution may be construed to provide more 
expansive protections than comparable federal 
constitutional provisions. However, the construction 
given to the Fourth Amendment of the federal 
constitution by the Supreme Court of the United 
States is strongly persuasive in construing the like 
section of our state constitution. Star Square Auto 
Supply Co. v. Gerk, 325 Mo. 968, 30 S.W.2d 447f 
456 (1930). The state and federal constitutional 
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures 
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are coextensive. State v. Jones, 865 S.W.2d 658, 
660 (Mo. banc 1993). 
[10] Despite its acceptance by the United States 
Supreme Court, Rushing invites this court to reject 
the plain-feel doctrine under our state constitution 
because, he argues, the doctrine blurs the limits of a 
Terry search. The invitation is declined. The plain-
feel doctrine, within the narrow limits set by 
Dickerson, does not countenance even the slightest 
expansion of the Terry patdown beyond that which 
is required to search for weapons. Rather, die 
plain-feel doctrine provides that if an officer 
discovers what is immediately apparent as 
contraband during the limited search for weapons, 
he is not required to ignore it. The plain-feel 
doctrine neither expands the scope of Terry nor 
blurs its limits. It is merely a logical extension of 
the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, 
which has long been accepted by Missouri courts as 
comporting with federal and state constitutional 
provisions. See, e.g., State v. Blankenship, 830 
S.W.2d 1, 14 (Mo. banc 1992). No justification 
exists for expanding the protection of article I, § 15, 
beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
IV. 
Finally, Rushing argues that the cocaine found 
wrapped in a dollar bill in his pocket following 
arrest should have been suppressed as the product of 
the supposedly illegal seizure prior to arrest. 
Because the original seizure of the medicine bottle 
containing cocaine is valid, the additional cocaine 
seized following the arrest is not the fruit of an 
illegal seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
BENTON, PRICE, LIMBAUGH and 
ROBERTSON, JJ., concur. 
COVINGTON, J., dissents in separate opinion 
filed. 
WHITE, J., concurs in opinion of COVINGTON, 
J. 
COVINGTON, Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. The question is whether the 
officer's tactile perception of the object gave him 
immediately, without further searching, probable 
cause to believe the object contained contraband. I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that Officer 
Price had probable cause to search the defendant's 
pocket. My disagreement with the majority is 
simply one of where to strike the proper balance. I 
believe that the effect of the majority opinion is to 
reduce the probable cause standard to one of 
reasonable suspicion. 
The majority relies on Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 
730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) 
(plurality opinion). Whether probable cause is 
required to invoke the plain-view doctrine, directly 
analogous to the plain-feel doctrine, was an issue 
left open in Brown. Later, however, in Arizona v. 
Hicks, a premises case, the United States Supreme 
Court held that probable cause is, in fact, required 
to invoke the plain-view doctrine. 480 U.S. 321, 
326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained: 
•35 Dispensing with the need for a warrant is 
worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of 
cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, 
i.e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is 
apparent why an object should routinely be 
seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated 
search and seizure, than would have been needed 
to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had 
been known to be on the premises. Id. at 327, 107 
S.Ct. at 1153-54. 
In Hicks, police officers entered an apartment 
looking for a suspect in an apartment shooting. 
They seized weapons and a ski-mask. One of the 
officers noticed two sets of expensive stereo 
components that looked out of place. He recorded 
the serial numbers. In order to view the serial 
numbers, he moved some of the components. He 
reported the numbers to headquarters. Upon being 
told that the turntable was reported stolen, he seized 
the turntable. The Court held that moving the 
components to view the serial numbers constituted a 
search unrelated to the search for the shooter and the 
weapons. Id. at 325, 107 S.Ct. at 1152-53. A 
finding of probable cause was required to uphold the 
search of the stereo components. Id. at 326, 107 
S.Ct. at 1153. The State conceded that the officer 
in Hicks had only reasonable suspicion to believe the 
components were stolen; therefore, the search was 
unconstitutional. Id. 
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Other jurisdictions have found similar searches to 
have exceeded the authority of Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 
2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). In Commonwealth 
v. Crowder, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
invalidated a search under circumstances similar to 
the present case. 884 S.W.2d 649 (Ky.1994). 
Crowder had been previously arrested in die same 
"hot drug area/ The police had received a tip that 
if Crowder was in that area he would be dealing 
drugs. When Crowder saw the police watching 
him, he walked away. The officer stopped him, 
searched him, and felt what the officer described as 
"something like a small gumball." The officer also 
stated that it "felt like it may have been a bindle of 
drugs." Id. at 650. The court stated that the search 
was invalid because the officer did not immediately 
recognize what he felt in Crowder's pocket as drugs. 
"The nature of the non- threatening contraband was 
not immediately apparent to [the] officer" when he 
was conducting the patdown search. Id. at 652. 
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Stackfield, an 
officer seized several zip-lock baggies after a 
patdown search. 438 Pa.Super. 88, 651 A.2d 558 
(1994). The officer testified that he thought the bags 
felt like packaging materials that are often used for 
carrying drugs. The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
held that the search was invalid. "A zip-lock baggie 
is not per se contraband, although material contained 
in a zip-lock baggie may well be." Id. 651 A.2d at 
562. See also Campbell v. State, 864 S.W.2d 223 
(Tex. App. 1993) ( "The incriminating character of a 
35 millimeter film canister was not 'immediately 
apparent' under the facts before us to justify its 
seizure"). These cases, read together with Arizona 
v. Hicks, would seem to tip the scales in favor of 
finding a lack of probable cause. 
The majority's reliance on Texas v. Brown is 
questionable in another respect; the majority 
extends Brown well beyond its facts. During a 
traffic stop a police officer saw Brown holding an 
uninflated, opaque, green party balloon tied off at 
the end. The balloon contained heroin. The Court 
held that the search was proper because the nature of 
the balloon as contraband was immediately apparent. 
Id. at 743, 103 S.Ct. at 1543-44. The balloon was 
in plain view; the officer did not have to search to 
find the contraband. 
The facts of the present case are distinguishable. 
Officer Price testified that he first patted down the 
defendant for "weapons and contraband." The 
officer searched the defendant and felt the bottle in 
his front pants pocket. The officer testified that he 
"thought it was a Life Savers Holes candy 
container." Although he testified further that he 
knew this to be a container commonly used by drug 
dealers to carry crack, there is nothing distinctive 
about a candy container. The container was actually 
a prescription pill bottle, and it was impossible for 
him to discern what the bottle contained. The nature 
•36 of the bottle as contraband was not apparent to 
the officer until after he removed the bottle from the 
defendant's pocket. Put another way, the nature of 
the container as contraband was not immediately 
apparent to the officer. 
Certainly there are factors that support affirmance 
in this case, those being the officer's information 
regarding defendant's drug activities and the 
officer's experience in narcotics enforcement. It 
would be difficult to disagree that Officer Price had 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying 
contraband. That suspicion, however, did not rise 
to the level of probable cause necessary for a valid 
search under Dickerson's plain-feel exception. 
Reasonable suspicion is not transformed into 
probable cause simply by relabeling. 
The search of the defendant's pocket and seizure of 
the bottle exceeded die scope of authority of Terry 
and Dickerson. I would reverse. 
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